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WHEN IS WHEN?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) AND THE
REQUIREMENTS OF MANDATORY DETENTION
Gerard Savaresse*
Over the past several decades, immigration law has come to resemble
criminal law in a number of ways. Most significantly, the current statutory
regime allows the U.S. Attorney General (AG) to detain noncitizens during
their removal proceedings. Ordinarily, the AG may detain noncitizens
subject to removal so long as the AG provides an individualized bond
hearing to assess whether the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to
the community. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), however, the AG must
detain and hold without bond any noncitizen who has committed qualifying
offenses “when the alien is released” from criminal custody throughout his
removal proceedings.
Courts disagree as to whether § 1226(c) requires the AG to detain
noncitizen offenders immediately, or whether the AG may allow a
noncitizen to return to the community for months, or even years, before
effecting detention and still retain the authority to detain the noncitizen
without a bond hearing. The question exists in the intersection between
criminal law and immigration law and the overlap between an agency’s
power to interpret statutes and the court’s obligation to do so. This Note
examines the timing question that § 1226(c) presents and offers a solution
that seeks to balance the liberty interests of detainees with the government’s
interests in protecting the community and ensuring removal.
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INTRODUCTION
Roman Gomez, a forty-three-year-old man from the Dominican
Republic, has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident
(LPR) for over twenty years.1 He has spent the last twenty-one months of
them in immigration detention. When he was younger, Mr. Gomez pled
guilty to several petit larceny charges.2 In 2009, he was arrested for rape
and held in pre-trial confinement at Rikers Island for over fourteen months.3
The rape charge was dropped upon the discovery of exculpatory evidence,
and Mr. Gomez was released on February 24, 2011.4 Four days later,
however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took him into
custody and held him without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),5 a provision
that calls for the mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted of certain
crimes “when the alien is released” from criminal custody.6 Mandatory
detention in these circumstances is justified by the government’s need to
ensure safety and to prevent noncitizen offenders from absconding during
their removal proceedings.7
According to DHS, Mr. Gomez’s petit larceny convictions were crimes
of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).8 As such, Mr.
1. Opening Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 3, Burgos v. Napolitano, No. 11-2682
(2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2011), 2011 WL 3675820, at *3.
2. Id. at 3–4.
3. Id. at 5 & n.4.
4. See id. at 5 & n.4, 6.
5. See id. at 6–7.
6. 8 U.S.C § 1226(c) (2006). For the full text of § 1226(c), see infra Part I.A.4.b.i.
7. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime
and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such
as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”).
Critics of mandatory detention look to the lowered Due Process protections available to
immigrants, the heightened attachments and expectations of LPRs, the deficiencies in the
data concerning the noncitizen offenders’ dangerousness and risk of flight, and the adequacy
of bond hearings to protect the government’s interests. See generally Margaret H. Taylor,
Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
8. In addition to challenging his detainability, Mr. Gomez also challenged his
removability by arguing that DHS’s inclusion of petit larceny as a crime of moral turpitude
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Gomez was not only subject to removal, but the government also
maintained that § 1226(c) authorized Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Officers to detain him without the possibility of a bond
hearing, even though he had not committed a qualifying offense in many
years.9 In support of its arguments, the government referred to a decision
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that held that § 1226(c) permits
DHS to detain noncitizen offenders at any time after they are released from
criminal custody.10
Mr. Gomez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern
District of New York, challenging DHS’s authority to detain him under
§ 1226(c).11 He argued that § 1226(c) authorizes DHS to detain without
bond only those individuals who are detained immediately upon release
from criminal custody for a removable offense.12 Because Mr. Gomez had
not committed a removable offense since 2004, he argued that he is not
within the ambit of § 1226(c).13 Consequently, the AG may provide him
with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). After
months battling in court, the Second Circuit dismissed Mr. Gomez’s
petition as moot.14
The issue of whether § 1226(c) requires immediate detention is not
unique to Mr. Gomez, and the consequences for him, and those similarly
situated, can be severe.15 Current data suggest that noncitizens held in
mandatory detention who contest their cases “commonly spend months, and
sometimes over a year, in detention because of enormous immigration court
backlogs.”16 According to a January 25, 2009 report by the American Civil
Liberties Union, ICE detained at least 4,170 individuals for six months or

was contrary to Second Circuit precedent. Opening Brief and Appendix of Appellant, supra
note 1, at 6. He is also challenging his second petit larceny conviction for ineffective
assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), arguing that he was
not notified of the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Opening Brief and
Appendix of Appellant, supra, at 4.
9. Gomez v. Napolitano, No. 11 Civ. 1350(JSR), 2011 WL 2224768, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 31, 2011).
10. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 125–26 (B.I.A. 2001).
11. Opening Brief and Appendix of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 4–5.
14. The district court denied Mr. Gomez’s petition for habeas relief on May 31, 2011.
Gomez, 2011 WL 2224768, at *5. He filed an appeal with the Second Circuit and argued the
case on December 14, 2011. Order of Dismissal at 2, Gomez v. Napolitano, No. 11-2682-cv
(2d Cir. June 5, 2012). In the intervening months, an immigration judge (IJ) issued a final
order of removal, and the government moved to have the appeal dismissed because Mr.
Gomez was being held under different authority. Id. The Second Circuit dismissed Mr.
Gomez’s appeal as moot on June 5, 2012. Id.
15. See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010) (describing the poor conditions of
confinement at detention facilities).
16. Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63, 81 (2012).
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longer, and of those, 1,334 had been detained for over a year.17 Some
individuals had been detained for over five years.18 Detainees are also
subject to transfers that both prolong detention and potentially impact the
ability to retain effective assistance of counsel.19
Despite the serious consequences that the BIA’s broad interpretation of
§ 1226(c) may have for noncitizen offenders, there is a paucity of
controlling precedent evaluating the validity and reasonableness of the
BIA’s interpretation.20 As the case of Mr. Gomez makes clear, once DHS
has finalized a removal order, courts may dismiss the case as moot because
DHS may detain the noncitizen under a different provision.21
This Note discusses whether § 1226(c) requires DHS to immediately
detain a noncitizen offender who has committed a qualifying offense “when
the alien is released” from criminal custody. If so, the Note then considers
whether DHS’s failure to take a noncitizen offender immediately into
custody precludes DHS from effecting detention under § 1226(c) and
requires instead that DHS detain such individuals pursuant to § 1226(a).
Under § 1226(a), DHS retains the authority to detain noncitizen offenders
and retains the discretion to provide a noncitizen with an individualized
bond hearing to assess whether he presents a danger to the community or a
flight risk.22
The BIA has interpreted the “when released” language to enable DHS to
take noncitizen offenders with qualifying convictions into custody at any
time after they are released from criminal custody.23 Applying the
framework for agency deference announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,24 several federal courts, including
the Fourth Circuit, have given deference to the BIA’s interpretation, finding
that § 1226(c) is ambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation is a
permissible construction.25 However, the majority of federal courts have
found that the plain meaning of § 1226(c) requires immediate detention.26
17. ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF: PROLONGED IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING REMOVAL 4 (2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prolonged_detention_issue_brief.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Noferi, supra note 16, at 66.
20. See Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, The Mandatory Detention Dilemma: The Role of
Federal Courts in Tempering the Scope of INA § 236(c), IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, July 2010, at 1.
21. Federal courts are only empowered to adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies, and
controversies which are no longer ongoing are said to be moot. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
317 (1988). However, a court may still adjudicate controversies that would otherwise be
moot if they are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,
482 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that the AG may release a noncitizen on
“bond of at least $1500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by,
the Attorney General”).
23. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 125 (B.I.A. 2001).
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also infra Part I.B.2 for a more comprehensive discussion
of the Chevron framework.
25. See, e.g., Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Hendricks, No. CIV. 12-6478(WJM), 2012 WL 6005713, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2012); Castillo v. ICE Field Office Dir., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash.
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Several courts have also found that the BIA’s interpretation is unreasonable
because the result is too attenuated from the justifications for mandatory
detention:
ensuring community safety and preventing removable
noncitizens from avoiding removal.27
Part I of this Note discusses the increasing overlap between crime and
immigration, and the complicated statutory and regulatory regime that
governs the immigration detention of noncitizen offenders. This Part also
explains the role of the federal courts in reviewing agency determinations in
the immigration context. Part II explores in more detail the conflict
between the BIA’s interpretation of the “when released” language, and
those courts that find that § 1226(c) unambiguously mandates DHS to
detain noncitizen offenders immediately upon their release from criminal
custody. Part III argues that § 1226(c) requires immediate detention.
Recognizing the practical difficulties this interpretation may present, Part
III also argues that the immediacy requirement should be understood to
allow DHS a reasonable time after the noncitizen is released from criminal
custody in which to effect detention. This approach balances the
government’s interests in protecting the community and securing removal
against a noncitizen’s liberty interests.
I. CRIME, IMMIGRATION, AND MANDATORY DETENTION
Those unfamiliar with modern immigration law and enforcement are
confronted by a vast and confusing array of statutes, regulations, and
enforcement agencies. Part I of this Note provides context for the timing
question that § 1226(c) presents by exploring the immigration consequences
of criminal conduct, as well as the legislative and legal history of § 1226(c).
Additionally, because the timing issue of § 1226(c) requires courts to
consider whether the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to
deference, the last section of Part I explains the appropriate framework for
judicial review of agency action.
A. The Intersection Between Crime and Immigration
The United States has factored criminal conduct into the calculus of its
immigration policy since the beginning years of the nation.28 Although
criminal acts have long served as a basis for removal, recent decades have
seen a significant expansion of the grounds for removal based on criminal
convictions, as well as a corresponding increase in the number of
immigrants removed for criminal conduct.29 For the entire period spanning
2012); Bogarin-Flores v. Napolitano, No. 12CV0399 JAH(WMC), 2012 WL 3283287, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012).
27. See, e.g., Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2009); Louisaire v. Muller,
758 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
28. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 380 (2006). However, early restrictions focused primarily on the
exclusion of individuals with criminal records, not their removal from the country once
admitted. See id. at 381.
29. Id. at 382–84.
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from 1908 until 1980, immigration authorities removed approximately
56,000 immigrants as a result of criminal convictions.30 In contrast, more
than 88,000 individuals were removed for criminal convictions in 2004
alone.31
The intersection between crime and immigration law is central to
determining whether § 1226(c) applies to noncitizen offenders who already
have been returned to the community after being released from criminal
custody. However, before moving on to a more comprehensive discussion
of the immigration consequences of criminal conduct, it is necessary to
outline the roles of the various agencies and departments charged with
enforcement of the immigration laws.
1. Enforcement Agencies and the Role of Courts
A number of different agencies enforce immigration laws.32 Although
other agencies play a significant role in the immigration scheme, the
following is a brief introduction to those agencies most relevant to
understanding whether § 1226(c) requires DHS to detain qualifying
offenders immediately upon release from criminal custody.
a. Department of Homeland Security
Currently, DHS maintains several immigration-related responsibilities
divided among a number of different bureaus. Of particular importance is
ICE, the agency charged with interior enforcement, including locating and
detaining individuals during and after removal proceedings.33 ICE also
represents the government during removal proceedings in immigration
court.34
b. Department of Justice
The most significant department within the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for immigration purposes is the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR). The EOIR houses the corps of Immigration Judges (IJs) and the
IJs are primarily responsible for presiding over removal
BIA.35
30. Id. at 386 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl.45 (2004), available at
www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics (follow “2004 Yearbook files” hyperlink)).
31. Id. (citing MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf).
32. In 2002, Congress enacted legislation that consolidated a number of federal agencies
into one department, dividing the responsibilities of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service amongst several departments of the Department of Homeland
Security. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA &
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 269 (6th ed.
2008).
33. Id. at 272–73.
34. Id. at 272.
35. Id. at 279–80.
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proceedings, and may exercise the discretion delegated to the AG for
waivers and applications of relief from removal.36
The BIA has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of IJs.37 The BIA
is a multimember review body of AG appointees.38 Currently, the BIA is
authorized to have fifteen members.39 Although the BIA has existed for
decades, it has never been recognized by statute and is solely a creature of
regulation.40 Nevertheless, “the [BIA] is the highest administrative body
for interpreting and applying [U.S.] immigration laws.”41 As such, the BIA
has the authority to issue final determinations in removal proceedings and
to set precedent for future proceedings.42 However, the BIA does not have
the authority to decide constitutional questions relating to immigration
law.43 Although single member review is available for certain appeals,
precedential decisions must be heard en banc or adopted by a majority of
the board.44
c. Federal Courts
The role of the courts is sharply circumscribed in the arena of
immigration.45 Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252 grants the courts the power to
review a final order of removal, most exercises of discretion delegated to
the AG, including relief from removal, are not reviewable.46 Moreover, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by
reason of having committed a criminal offense.”47 Courts, however, have
asserted jurisdiction to resolve constitutional questions and “pure questions
of law” through habeas review.48 Congress has now explicitly recognized
the court’s jurisdiction over such matters in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).49

36. Id. at 278–80.
37. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013).
38. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 281; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a).
39. There are presently fourteen full-time members serving on the BIA, as well as a
number of temporary members. Board of Immigration Appeals Biographical Information,
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm (last updated May 2012).
Temporary members may adjudicate cases to which they are assigned, but may not vote in
en banc, precedential decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4).
40. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 281.
41. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
biainfo.htm (last updated Nov. 2011).
42. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 282–83.
43. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 138 (B.I.A. 2001) (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
44. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2006). See generally, Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear
and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1615 (2000).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); see also infra Part I.A.2.b (noting that relief from removal is
often the only recourse available to noncitizens in removal proceedings).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
48. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001).
49. Courts may also assert jurisdiction over agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011).
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The courts have treated § 1226(c)’s timing question as a pure question of
law.50
2. Removal and Relief from Removal
The basis for immigration detention in American immigration law is
directly related to a noncitizen’s removability or inadmissibility. Thus, any
discussion of immigration detention must reference the grounds for
removal, and the manner in which noncitizens may obtain relief from
removal.
a. Removal
The grounds for removal are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and include
inadmissibility,51 criminal offenses,52 failure to register and falsification of
documents,53 other security based grounds including “terrorist activities,”54
and becoming a “public charge.”55 Upon initiating removal proceedings,
the DHS must issue a Notice to Appear specifying, among other things, the
nature of the proceeding, the grounds for removal, and the conduct said to
be in violation of the law.56 IJs preside over removal proceedings,57 which
are subject to appeal to the BIA.58 A federal court of appeals may review
an administratively final order of removal,59 but courts are precluded from
reviewing several kinds of matters, including any exercise of discretion by
the AG.60 This also includes review of removal determinations predicated
on a conviction of an aggravated felony, or two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude (CIMT).61

50. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Muller, No. 11 CIV. 7857(RJS), 2012 WL 252188, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2012) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003)).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). Inadmissible aliens are those “who are ineligible to receive
visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.” Id. § 1182(a); see also ALEINIKOFF
ET AL., supra note 32, at 693.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
53. Id. § 1227(a)(3).
54. Id. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
55. Id. § 1227(a)(5) (“Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has
become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is
deportable.”).
56. Id. § 1229(a)(1). Section 1229 also provides that removal proceedings may not
commence before ten days after service of the Notice to Appear to ensure that the noncitizen
has sufficient time to secure counsel. Id. § 1229(b)(1). However, the government will not
provide counsel for a noncitizen in removal proceedings. Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
57. Id. § 1229a(a)(1).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
60. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
61. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see supra Part I.A.3.
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b. Relief from Removal
Surprisingly, the most important issue in most removal proceedings is not
the basis for removal itself, but rather the noncitizen’s application for relief
from removal.62 Most grounds for removal are relatively straightforward,
and frequently it makes little sense to challenge them.63 Relief from
removal is subject exclusively to the discretion of the political branches
either through prosecutorial and adjudicatory discretion, deferred action, a
stay of removal, or cancellation of removal.64 Notably, individuals
convicted of an “aggravated felony” are not eligible for a cancellation of
removal.65
3. Crime and Immigration
Because the determination of whether a noncitizen has committed an
aggravated felony or two or more CIMT is essential to the government’s
authority to detain noncitizens under § 1226(c), this section will discuss the
contours of those two categories of noncitizen offenders.
a. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
The term “moral turpitude” has been a part of the immigration laws since
1891.66 Despite the serious immigration consequences of committing a
CIMT, Congress has not provided any guidance for determining what
constitutes a CIMT.67 Rather, the determination of whether a crime
constitutes a CIMT is made on a case-by-case basis.68 The BIA has set
forth its understanding of what kinds of crime will be considered a CIMT as
those involving “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being
inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the
duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in
general.”69 The BIA has found a number of very different crimes to be
CIMT.70
62. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 775.
63. Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 7, at 356–57.
64. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 775–93.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
66. Annotation, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within Meaning
of §§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(9),
1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of
Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480, § 2(a) (2013).
67. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2009).
68. Id.
69. In re Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615, 618 (B.I.A. 1992); see also In re Danesh,
19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988).
70. As one circuit judge complained, “The BIA has designated offenses ranging from
the knowing possession of child pornography, to the sale of ‘a number of packages of
oleomargarine labeled as butter’ . . . as ‘morally reprehensible’ conduct, without specifying
with any clarity what ‘the nature of th[ose] act[s]’ have in common.” Marmolejo-Campos,
558 F.3d at 923 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 475, 477 (B.I.A. 1996)); see also Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful
Permanent Residents for Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending
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Fortunately, this Note need not attempt to define what Justice Jackson
once called an “undefined and undefinable standard.”71 It is sufficient to
note that the CIMT category embraces a number of different, and seemingly
unrelated, crimes. As one district court judge opined, jumping a turnstile in
the New York City subway system may even be considered a CIMT.72
Indeed, in 2007, ICE detained and sought removal of Edward Lloyd
Johnson, a Jamaican national and LPR, for violating New York Penal Law
§ 165.15 when he failed to pay his subway fare.73 Johnson was detained for
three years before the Third Circuit heard his appeal,74 remanding for
further supplementation of the record.75
b. Aggravated Felonies
Determining precisely which crimes will constitute an aggravated felony,
and hence which crimes will result in removal and mandatory detention, is
no less difficult than determining whether a crime is one involving moral
turpitude.76 Courts typically employ a categorical approach to determine
whether a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony.77 Under the
categorical approach, a reviewing court will compare the elements of a state
crime to determine whether they are analogous to a federal felony.78 Thus,
the inquiry focuses on the category of the crime and not on the specific facts
of the underlying criminal conduct.79 Other courts also employ a “modified
categorical approach.”80 The modified categorical approach involves a
fact-intensive review to determine whether the criminal conduct would
satisfy the elements of a federal felony.81
Clearly, the determination of whether a crime constitutes an aggravated
felony is a complex one. As the Supreme Court recently noted, the analysis
is complicated by the fact that several different agencies and courts interpret
the statute.82 As with CIMT, critics have argued that the expanded
provisions calling for mandatory detention and removal for aggravated
Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation As Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 800 (2012)
(noting that crimes such as knowingly issuing a check without funds, petit larceny, and
lewdness have all been held to be CIMT).
71. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 235 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
72. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
73. Johnson v. Holder, 413 F. App’x 435, 437 (3d Cir. 2010).
74. Detainees may file habeas petitions only in the jurisdiction in which they are
detained. Valdez v. Terry, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (D.N.M. 2012) (citing Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)).
75. Johnson, 413 F. App’x at 436; see also Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why
Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 648 (2012) (“[C]ourts should
find the term CIMT in deportation law is void for vagueness, notwithstanding the Jordan
decision.”).
76. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
77. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 1857 (2012); Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
78. Moncrieffe, 662 F.3d at 391.
79. Id.
80. Randhawa, 298 F.3d at 1152.
81. Id.
82. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
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felonies are overinclusive.83 One commentator notes that “the list of
offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies is too long and the list of
remedies available to immigrants convicted of aggravated felonies seeking
to forestall their deportation is too short.”84 Although this Note does not
seek to determine if, or how, the noted overinclusiveness should be
remedied, the concern is relevant when considering whether Congress
intended all noncitizens potentially convicted of such felonies to be
mandatorily detained irrespective of when they were released from criminal
custody.
4. Immigration Detention
The capacity of the United States to detain immigrants to facilitate
removal is long established. In Wong Wing v. United States,85 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that detention in the removal context is not
punishment, but a form of “temporary confinement” necessary to effect
removal or exclusion.86 The following sections discuss the two detention
provisions most relevant to this Note: nonmandatory detention, as codified
in § 1226(a), and mandatory detention, § 1226(c).
a. Nonmandatory Detention
Today, under § 1226(a), “an alien may be arrested and detained pending
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”87
The AG has discretion to release the noncitizen on bond or conditional
parole.88 However, the Attorney General retains the authority to rearrest an
individual under the original warrant.89 Bond hearings are conducted
before an IJ, who may release a noncitizen offender on bond if she is
satisfied that the noncitizen does not pose a danger, a flight risk, or a threat

83. See Andrew David Kennedy, Expedited Injustice: The Problems Regarding the
Current Law of Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1847, 1873–74
(2007); Natalie Liem, Mean What You Say, Say What You Mean: Defining the Aggravated
Felony Deportation Grounds To Target More Than Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L. REV.
1071, 1090 (2007) (discussing how courts have ignored the lower-limit threshold
contemplated by Congress while expanding the kinds of crimes considered aggravated
felonies under the categorical approach).
84. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1873–74.
85. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
86. Id. at 235. However, in Wong Wing, the Court struck down a portion of an 1892
statute that provided for the imprisonment and forced labor of illegal Chinese immigrants.
Id. at 237 (“But when Congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by subjecting the
persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their
property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish
the guilt of the accused.”). Thus, immigration detention that serves the interest of facilitating
exclusion or removal is constitutionally valid, while detention that serves a punitive function
is not. Id.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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to national security.90 The BIA has outlined several factors that should be
taken into consideration during bond hearings, including, among others,
whether the noncitizen has a fixed address, employment history, the extent
of the criminal conduct, and the existence of family ties in the United
States.91
b. Mandatory Detention
Congress passed the first mandatory detention provision in 1988.92 The
Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established deportability for persons
convicted of aggravated felonies and directed the government to detain “any
alien convicted of an aggravated felony upon completion of the alien’s
sentence for such conviction.”93 On April 24, 1996, President Clinton
signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), expanding the definition of aggravated felonies, as well as the
criteria for crimes of moral turpitude.94 Just a few months later, President
Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), of which § 1226(c) is a part. In
addition to expanding the grounds for mandatory detention significantly,
the IIRIRA further redefined aggravated felonies, expanded grounds for
removability, and limited judicial review.95 The following sections discuss
the text, legislative history, and constitutionality of § 1226(c).
i. Text of § 1226(c)
The full text of § 1226(c) provides:
(c) Detention of criminal aliens
(1) Custody
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis
of an offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to a term of
imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

90. DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES 578
(Maria Baldini-Potermin ed., Summer 2012 ed. 2012).
91. Id.
92. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 122–23 (B.I.A. 2001).
93. Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat. 4181,
4470.
94. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214; see also IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE AND REFERENCE TOOL 8 (12th ed. 2010).
95. KURZBAN, supra note 94, at 8–9.
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(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable
under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released
on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether
the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
(2) Release
The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1)
only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18
that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to
a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation
into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close
associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such
an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien
will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is
likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such
release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the
severity of the offense committed by the alien.96

The statute is divided into two paragraphs. Paragraph (1) provides a
description of individuals subject to mandatory detention, and paragraph (2)
provides that, absent certain limited circumstances, the AG may not release
“an alien described in paragraph (1).”97 Paragraph (1) contains four
subparagraphs, each referring to a different section of Title 8, detailing the
circumstances in which a noncitizen must be mandatorily detained.98
Subparagraph (A) provides that the AG shall detain any noncitizen who is
inadmissible for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude or any
law of the United States or a foreign country involving a controlled
substance.99 Subparagraphs (B) and (C) concern deportable noncitizens,
including LPRs.100 The provisions in Subparagraph (B) include any
noncitizen who has committed two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude,101 and any noncitizen who has committed an aggravated
felony.102 The statute does not anywhere define either crimes of moral
turpitude or aggravated felony.103 Subparagraph (C) provides that the AG
must detain any noncitizen who has committed one CIMT for which she
was convicted and sentenced to a term of one year or more. Finally,
subparagraph (D) adds that the AG must detain any noncitizen who is
inadmissible,104 or deportable,105 as a result of a noncitizen’s membership

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 1226(c)(1).
Id. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (citing Id. § 1182(a)(2)).
Id. § 1226(c)(1).
Id. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (citing Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
Id. (citing Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
See supra Part I.A.3.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D) (citing Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)).
Id. (citing Id. § 1227(a)(4)(B)).
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or association with a terrorist organization.106 The AG is required to detain
each such noncitizen “when the alien is released” from criminal custody.107
ii. Legislative History and Purpose of § 1226(c)
A 1995 Senate Report suggests that, by enacting § 1226(c), Congress
sought to curtail the “serious and growing threat to public safety” posed by
criminal noncitizens.108 According to the report, “While the term ‘criminal
aliens’ is not specifically defined statutorily, it applies mainly to aliens
convicted of ‘aggrevated [sic] felonies’ or crimes involving moral
turpitude.”109 At the time of the report, there were an estimated 450,000
such individuals in the criminal justice system at any given time.110 The
report also noted a strong connection between illegal entry and criminal
activity, as those who enter “illegally have no legitimate sponsors and are
prohibited from holding jobs . . . [c]riminal conduct may be the only way to
survive.” 111
Of the estimated 450,000 noncitizens in the criminal justice system, the
report noted that only 19,000 such individuals were deported in 1993.112
The Committee calculated that it would take twenty-three years to deport all
existing criminal noncitizens at the current rate.113 The Committee noted
the impact on law enforcement, the danger posed to the community by the
presence of criminal noncitizens, and the drain on public resources.114
Although there was much debate about how to attack the problem of crime
in America, the Committee stated that there was “a consensus” within the
nation about how to approach criminal noncitizens: “[T]here is just no
place in America for non-U.S. citizens who commit criminal acts here.
America has enough criminals without importing more.”115
The Committee identified a number of factors contributing to the poor
rate of deportation, the most significant of which for purposes of this Note
was the release of noncitizen offenders on bond.116 More than 20 percent
of undetained noncitizen offenders failed to report for their removal
proceedings, and still more absconded after having been issued a final order
of removal.117 To remedy this problem, the Committee recommended that
“Congress should consider requiring that all aggravated felons be detained

106. Id.
107. Id. § 1226(c)(1).
108. S. REP. No. 104-48, at 1 (1995).
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 13–14.
117. Id. at 2, 23–24. But see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 562–63 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Taylor, supra note 7, at 348–54 (disputing the accuracy of the figures).
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pending deportation. Such a step may be necessary because of the high rate
of no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond.”118
Congress deferred full implementation of § 1226(c) for two years to
allow immigration authorities sufficient time to adapt to the new regime.119
Congress provided the Transition Period Custody Rules (TPCR) to cover
the intervening years.120 The TPCR allowed for individualized bond
hearings for noncitizens convicted of certain crimes fitting within the newly
expanded CIMT and aggravated felony classifications.121 The TPCR
expired in 1998, and § 1226(c) became effective.122
iii. A Constitutional Challenge to § 1226(c): Demore v. Kim
In Demore v. Kim,123 the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the
constitutionality of § 1226(c).124 The respondent, Hyung Joon Kim, an
LPR since the age of six and a citizen of South Korea, successfully argued
before the Ninth Circuit that, as an LPR, he was entitled to a determination
of whether he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. Section
1226(c), he argued, violated his substantive due process rights by requiring
his detention without such a determination.125 The Supreme Court, in a
five-to-four decision, reversed, holding that Congress “may require that
persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for
their removal proceedings.”126 The Court did not announce what standard
of review it applied.127
In holding as it did, the Court reached several significant conclusions.
First, the Court found that in failing to challenge his inclusion in the

118. S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 32 (1995).
119. Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009); In re Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 672, 674–75 (B.I.A. 1997).
120. Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 674–75.
121. Saysana, 590 F.3d at 10 n.2.
122. Id.
123. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
124. At the age of eighteen, Mr. Kim was convicted of burglary for breaking into a tool
shed with his high school friends. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 343. He served a short jail
term, but after his release from prison, he was later caught shoplifting on two separate
occasions. Id. California authorities prosecuted his second shoplifting offense as “a petty
theft with priors,” and he was sentenced to three years in prison. Id. at 344. He was released
in less than two years on good behavior. Id. One day after he was released, immigration
authorities took him into custody under § 1226(c), stating at first that he was subject to
mandatory detention for having committed an aggravated felony, and later, for having
committed two CIMT. Id.
125. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514.
126. Id. at 513.
127. Without further explanation, the majority stated that the government was not
required to employ the least burdensome means of achieving its goals. Id. at 528; see also
Brian Smith, Charles Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim: Another Step Away from Full Due
Process Protections, 38 AKRON L. REV. 207, 238 (2005). The dissenters in Demore argued
that, because LPRs have historically enjoyed the same due process protections as citizens,
the Court should have applied heightened scrutiny review, in which the government must
demonstrate that the challenged law is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling
government interest. Demore, 538 U.S. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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mandatory detention categories Kim had conceded his removability.128
While recognizing that “‘the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process
of law in deportation proceedings,’”129 the Court stated that “‘any policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government.’”130 Because longstanding precedent allowed for detention as a permissible part of the
removal process,131 and because Kim had conceded his removability, the
Court concluded that Kim could be detained “for the limited period of his
removal proceedings.”132 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is noteworthy, as
it leaves open the possibility for as-applied challenges to the length of
individual detention.133
Although the impact of § 1226(c)’s legislative history on the outcome of
Demore is unclear, the Court did engage in an extended discussion of the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 1226(c). The Court
ultimately concluded that Congress was “justifiably concerned that
deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime
and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers.”134 The
Court noted, for example, “Criminal aliens were the fastest growing
segment of the federal prison population,”135 and that “[t]he [immigration
authorities’] near-total inability to remove deportable criminal aliens
imposed more than a monetary cost on the Nation.”136 The Court also
found that, because “more than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to
appear for their removal hearings,”137 the agency’s failure to detain
noncitizens during detention proceedings was a major cause of the agency’s
failure to remove deportable criminal noncitizens.138 Finally, the Court
observed that Congress made “incremental changes to the immigration

128. Id. at 522–23, 531 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at 523 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).
130. Id. at 522 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952)).
Professor Margaret Taylor notes that the majority’s approach represented a departure from
then-current Supreme Court decisions, which appeared to recognize greater procedural
protections for noncitizens. Taylor, supra note 7, at 366. She argues that the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001 had an undeniable effect on the contraction of these protections and
caused the Court’s “retreat[] to a strong version of plenary power deference that some
observers thought had been buried by the Zadvydas decision.” Id. at 365.
131. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
132. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
133. Id. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that where deportation proceedings
are unreasonably delayed, it may become necessary to inquire whether the detention is to
incarcerate for other reasons, rather than to facilitate deportation or protect against risk of
flight or dangerousness).
134. Id. at 513 (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 518.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 519. The dissent noted that these statistics are misleading because they failed
to account for the potential differences between LPRs and other noncitizen offenders, and
because the bond grant was frequently a function of limited bed space—not a determination
of the noncitizen offenders’ flight risk. See id. at 562–64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 519 (majority opinion).
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laws,” while at the same time “considering wholesale reform of those
laws.”139
The dissent stressed that Kim had not, in fact, conceded his removability
and that the majority cited “no statement before any court conceding
removability.”140 The dissent also stressed that “the immigration laws give
LPRs the opportunity to establish a life permanently in this country by
developing economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those
of a citizen.”141 As such, the dissent concluded that the government could
not detain a “still lawful permanent resident alien when there is no reason
for it and no way to challenge it.”142
c. Detention: Process and Procedural Safeguards
The immigration detention system is now the largest detention system in
the United States, with far more admissions than the Federal Bureau of
Prisons or any other state correctional system.143 According to a DHS
report, roughly 363,000 individuals passed through immigration detention
in 2010 alone.144 Immigration authorities removed 169,000 noncitizen
offenders in the same period.145 The report does not indicate the number of
individuals who were detained under § 1226(c).
i. Custody Determinations and the Notice To Appear
ICE officials may take a noncitizen into custody pursuant to an ICE
arrest, in execution of a detainer146 after a local police stop, or upon
completion of incarceration for a prior criminal conviction.147 When ICE
detains an individual without a warrant, ICE must provide that individual
139. Id. at 521. Professor Taylor argues that the Court’s characterization of the IIRIRA’s
enactment is misleading because Congress had not taken as measured a response to the
problem of crime and immigration as the Court’s opinion might suggest. Taylor, supra note
7, at 354. On the contrary, she suggests that “Congress circumvented the usual obstacles of
the legislative process . . . and instead secured the passage of controversial immigration
reform measures by appending them to larger omnibus bills that were certain to be enacted.”
Id. Because the statute embraces minor crimes such as petty larceny, the result, she claims,
was legislation that leads to a “steep human cost,” as well as a significant expenditure of
government resources. See id. at 361–62 (noting that the former Commissioner and three
former General Counsels of the INS filed an amicus brief in Demore arguing against the
statute).
140. Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 544.
142. Id. at 576.
143. Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and
Immigrant Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1446 n.42 (2010).
144. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATIONS
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf.
145. Id.
146. An ICE detainer advises another law enforcement agency that the agency has a
noncitizen in its custody that ICE seeks to remove and requests that the agency notify ICE
prior to releasing the noncitizen so that ICE may arrange for a custody transfer. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(a) (2013).
147. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (2013).
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with a custody determination within forty-eight hours,148 and a Notice to
Appear within seventy-two hours.149 The custody determination may be
made by a number of DHS officials, including an ICE detention officer,150
and is often made by an individual with little or no legal training.151
ii. Joseph Hearings
Named after the precedential BIA determination, In re Joseph,152 the
Joseph hearing represents the detainee’s sole opportunity to challenge a
DHS officer’s decision that he is subject to mandatory detention.153
Although the AG enjoys only limited discretion to release a noncitizen
properly held under § 1226(c),154 the BIA determined in Joseph that the AG
may assert jurisdiction, upon a detainee’s request, to ascertain whether the
detainee is “properly included” within a mandatory detention category.155
The hearing is conducted before an IJ, who may find that a detainee is
not properly included in a mandatory detention category if the IJ is
“convinced that the [government] is substantially unlikely to prevail on its
charge.”156 If the detainee prevails, then he is entitled to a bond
determination, as per § 1226(a).157 Either party may appeal the IJ’s
determination to the BIA.158 During the pendency of the appeal, DHS may
invoke an “automatic stay” to prevent the detainee from being released until
the BIA has decided the appeal.159
Because Joseph hearings represent the sole opportunity for a detainee to
contest whether he has committed a qualifying offense that would subject
148. Id. § 287.3(d).
149. See Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary, Border & Transp. Sec., to
Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and Robert
Bonner, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 3 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/ICEGuidance.pdf.
150. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(g)(1); see also id. § 287.5(e)(2).
151. See Noferi, supra note 16, at 83. Professor Noferi argues that the absence of legal
review leads to overcharging and overdetention. Id. at 84. He also notes that Form I-286
(Notice of Custody Determination) requires revision because it suggests that the detainee
may not request a review of the custody determination, despite the availability of a Joseph
hearing. Id. at 121.
152. 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999).
153. See Noferi, supra note 16, at 63.
154. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2006).
155. See Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 800.
156. Id. at 807 (“In requiring that the Immigration Judge be convinced that the Service is
substantially unlikely to prevail on its charge, when making this determination before the
resolution of the underlying case, we provide both significant weight to the Service’s reason
to believe that led to the charge and genuine life to the regulation that allows for an
Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157. In Joseph, for example, an IJ ultimately found that the detainee’s underlying
criminal conviction for “obstructing and hindering” did not constitute an aggravated felony
for purposes of § 1226(c). Id. at 807–08.
158. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3)(i).
159. Id. § 1003.19(i)(2); see also Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s Order: The
Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89,
109–11 (2010) (arguing that the automatic stay presents “an affront to the adversarial
system” that should not be permitted).
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him to mandatory detention, they have become an important defense
strategy.160 Indeed, the Supreme Court seemed to place great importance
on the availability of the Joseph hearing in Demore v. Kim, finding that,
because the petitioner had failed to request a Joseph hearing, he had
conceded his deportability.161 Although the Court did not say so directly, it
seems unlikely that the Court would have been as comfortable upholding
the petitioner’s mandatory detention had no procedure been available to
prevent against the erroneous risk of deprivation.162
Nevertheless, several commentators have suggested that Joseph hearings
are procedurally inadequate in practice.163
Critics note that the
determination of whether an individual’s criminal conviction is properly
within one of the mandatory detention categories involves a complex legal
analysis, yet detainees are not entitled to counsel.164 Moreover, detention
itself may interfere with an individual’s ability to retain counsel,
particularly where the detainee remains subject to frequent transfers.165
Critics also note that the burden to demonstrate that removal is
“substantially unlikely” is too heavy, and that the evidentiary standards
favor the government.166 Finally, there is no requirement that IJs produce a
written determination, but rather the decision is rendered orally based on
what are arguably “‘incomplete facts and unresolved legal questions.’”167
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Because the BIA has issued a precedential decision offering the agency’s
interpretation of the “when released” language, this section discusses the
framework that courts employ to determine whether an agency’s action is
entitled to judicial deference. Generally, Congress may delegate power to
an executive agency to secure the effects of legislation provided that
Congress supplies an “intelligible principle” to the agency to guide its
efforts.168 Delegation of this sort is justified by the need for the efficiency,
flexibility, and expertise that specialized agencies can provide.169 In
160. Taylor, supra note 7, at 356–57 (“For long-term lawful permanent residents facing
deportation on criminal grounds, eligibility for relief today hinges on whether the conviction
is properly classified as an aggravated felony.”).
161. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2003).
162. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 355–57.
163. See, e.g., Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural
Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51,
76–95 (2006); Noferi, supra note 16, at 87–88.
164. See Noferi, supra note 16, at 100–21. Professor Noferi also notes that although
discovery is seldom permitted in immigration proceedings, IJs commonly grant
adjournments to ICE attorneys to produce sufficient evidence during which time the
immigrant remains detained. Id. at 87.
165. See id. at 77.
166. See Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially Unlikely”: An Empirical Analysis
of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65,
76 (2011); see also Noferi, supra note 16, at 87.
167. Noferi, supra note 16, at 87 (quoting Dona, supra note 166, at 12).
168. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
169. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514.
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addition to challenging the constitutionality of agency action, detainees may
challenge agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act170 (APA),
as well as the agency’s interpretation of the statute the agency enforces.171
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA outlines the manner in which agencies may act to effectuate
legislation and establishes the default procedures for rulemaking, policy
statements, and adjudications.172 Many of the more demanding and formal
procedures that exist in the context of rulemakings are substantially relaxed
in the context of adjudications.173 Because of the flexibility they provide,
the Court has long recognized that agencies may proceed through
adjudications, rather than rulemaking, to set precedents and policy that have
the force of law.174
The APA grants federal courts the power to decide all questions of law
relating to agency action, and requires courts to set aside agency action that
they find to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law.”175 The arbitrary and capricious standard
may be used to review the procedures employed in an adjudication in the
context of immigration proceedings.
In Judulang v. Holder,176 for example, the Court held that the BIA’s
“comparable grounds” approach to determining whether to grant relief to a
removable noncitizen pursuant to former INA 212(c) was arbitrary and
Although the role of Judulang is unclear, some
capricious.177
commentators characterize the Court’s ruling as an erosion of the deference
typically afforded to the executive branch in the immigration context.178
170. See infra Part I.B.1.
171. See infra Part I.B.2.
172. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006); see also JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 582–604 (2010).
173. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (discussing the flexibility
provided by an agency’s adjudication powers).
174. Id.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (establishing that, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, an
“agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’”
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
176. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
177. See id. at 484 (“By hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on
the chance correspondence between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s
fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned
manner.”). For more on Judulang and the comparable grounds approach, see Maria BaldiniPotermin, Lessons from a “Coin Flip”: The U.S. Supreme Court and § 212(c) (Again), 89
INTERPRETER RELEASES 293, 294–95 (2012).
178. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 177, at 294; Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion:
How Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels
for Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103903 (“Judulang pushed back against a (perceived) history of
special deference to the executive branch on immigration matters, and thus supports a
reading of the executive’s role in immigration law as no . . . different from its role in
ordinary domestic jurisprudence.”).
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2. Chevron: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation
Litigants may also challenge an agency’s interpretation of the statute an
agency enforces. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,179 the Court articulated the modern approach to reviewing an
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers. When a reviewing
court finds the statute at issue ambiguous, the court should defer to the
agency’s interpretation, provided the interpretation is reasonable.180 Cass
Sunstein has referred to the Chevron approach as “a kind of counterMarbury for the administrative state,” one that finds in statutory ambiguity
an implicit delegation by Congress to the agency to “say what the law
is.”181 Thus, under the original iteration of the Chevron doctrine, a court’s
inquiry is two-fold: (1) the court must determine whether a statute is
ambiguous; and if so (2) whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.182
a. Whether Congress Has Spoken to the Precise Issue
Under Chevron step one, a court reviewing an agency interpretation of a
statute must first ask if Congress has spoken to the “precise question at
issue.”183 The reviewing court is to employ the “traditional tools of
statutory construction”184 in seeking to determine “clear congressional
intent.”185 If the court finds that the statute is unambiguous, “that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”186 If the statute remains
ambiguous after the court’s interpretive pass, then the court must proceed to
step two of the inquiry.187
b. Whether the Agency’s Interpretation Is “Permissible”
If the court finds that the statute is ambiguous—that is to say, that
Congress has not spoken to the precise issue—then Congress is presumed to
179. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
180. See id. at 842–43.
181. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006).
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
183. Id. at 843.
184. Id. at 843 n.9. Although the precise contours of these interpretive tools have
spawned debate, it is sufficient for purposes of this Note simply to recognize that no
consensus exists. Compare Scalia, supra note 169, at 521 (“One who finds more often (as I
do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other
laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It
is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though
reasonable, I would not personally adopt.”), with Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2106 (1990) (“Whether there is ambiguity—the
nominal trigger for deference under Chevron—is a function not ‘simply’ of text, but of text
as it interacts with principles of interpretation, some of them deeply engrained in the legal
culture or even the culture more generally.”).
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
186. Id. at 842–43.
187. Id.

2013]

THE REQUIREMENTS OF MANDATORY DETENTION

307

have implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency.188 So long as
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, “[the] court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”189 Thus, the agency is not
required to have chosen the same construction that the court would have.190
C. Step Zero and Its Consequences
Later cases have recognized the need for a third step in the Chevron
analysis: whether the Chevron framework should be applied at all.191 The
Court sought to define this space more clearly in United States v. Mead
Corp.192 Recognizing that agencies may act in a number of different ways,
the Court acknowledged in Mead that not every agency interpretation
should be granted Chevron deference.193 As a later Court put it, “Chevron
deference, however, is not accorded merely because the statute is
ambiguous and an administrative official is involved.”194
In the Court’s formulation, Chevron applies “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”195 To determine whether
Congress has delegated authority to the agency, the Court noted that when
there is an “express congressional authorization[] to engage in the process
of rulemaking or adjudication,” then there is a very “good indicator” that
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency.196 Thus, “[t]he
linchpin for deference is therefore the power to act with the force of law” in
conjunction with the level of formality with which the agency has exercised
that power.197
In circumstances where Chevron deference would be inappropriate, a
reviewing court is instructed to afford the agency a lesser form of
deference, referred to as Skidmore198 deference. In determining whether an
agency’s position is entitled to deference under Skidmore, the court is to
consider “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”199
188. Id.
189. Id. at 844.
190. Id.
191. As Professor Cass Sunstein notes, the Step Zero space has become the “location of
an intense and longstanding disagreement between the Court’s two administrative law
specialists, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia.” Sunstein, supra note 181, at 192.
A fuller treatment of this disagreement is beyond the scope of this Note.
192. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
193. See id. at 233–34.
194. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006).
195. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
196. Id. at 229. The Court also noted, without clarifying, that there are other
circumstances where Chevron deference might be appropriate. See id. at 231.
197. Sunstein, supra note 181, at 214.
198. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
199. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40). In a vigorous dissent
in Mead, Justice Scalia characterized the majority’s opinion as “breathing new life into the
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In the years since the Mead decision, the Court has not always been
precise in defining when, and how, to properly employ the Step Zero
inquiry. At times, for example, the Court has framed the issue in terms of
“the interpretive method used [by the agency], and the nature of the
question at issue.”200 In other instances, the Court has pointed to the
explicitness of the congressional delegation of authority, as in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: “[W]e are confident that Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”201
These decisions appear to reflect the Court’s hesitation to defer to agency
interpretations on large or fundamental issues.202 Such decisions conflict
with the simple, two-step solution to the problem of judicial review of
agency interpretations offered by Chevron.203 Indeed, at least one
commentator noted, “Classic Chevron analysis is dead,”204 and Skidmore
has become “a better predictor of whether courts will uphold or overrule
federal agency interpretations.”205 The scope of this Note precludes a fuller
treatment of this rich issue. It is sufficient here to note that the Court has,
subsequent to Chevron, expressed its concerns about deferring to agency
interpretations of fundamental issues.206
D. Chevron and the Rule of Lenity
Among the traditional tools of statutory construction available to a
reviewing court are the linguistic and substantive canons of construction.
Linguistic canons operate as rules of thumb to aid in discerning the
meaning of a particular word or phrase within a statute.207 Substantive
canons, on the other hand, reflect normative judgments and policy
preferences about how laws should be interpreted.208 These substantive
canons include the canon of constitutional avoidance, the presumption
anachronism of Skidmore.” Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He argued instead that
Chevron should operate as “an across-the-board presumption,” stating that statutory
ambiguity alone is the trigger for Chevron deference. Id. at 257.
200. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
201. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
202. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 193 (“[T]he Court has raised a separate Step Zero
question by suggesting the possibility that deference will be reduced, or even nonexistent, if
a fundamental issue is involved, one that goes to the heart of the regulatory scheme at
issue.”); see also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. In Brown & Williamson, the Court
noted that although ambiguity in a statute is ordinarily understood to be an implicit
delegation from Congress, “there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id. According to the Court, important legal
questions are more likely to have been decided by Congress, and not delegated to an agency
to interpret. Id.
203. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 193–94.
204. Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and
Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 239 (2008).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., supra note 202 and accompanying text.
207. Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 7
(2006).
208. Id.
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against retroactivity, and—of particular relevance here—the rule of
lenity.209 The rule of lenity states that ambiguity in criminal statutes should
be construed narrowly, or resolved against the government.210 Although
typically employed when interpreting criminal statutes, the rule of lenity
may be employed in deportation proceedings as well.211 Generally, the rule
of lenity is only invoked as a last resort, when “‘after seizing everything
from which aid can be derived,’” the court still cannot discern the intent of
Congress.212
The extent to which Chevron interacts with substantive canons of
construction is unclear.213 In INS v. St. Cyr,214 for example, the Supreme
Court applied the presumption against retroactivity at the Step One phase in
determining that § 1226(c) did not apply to noncitizens who had been
convicted of crimes prior to enactment of the statute.215 However, the
Court has never explicitly applied the rule of lenity in a Chevron context,
despite the increasing criminal liability imposed by agency regulations.216
Not surprisingly, then, there is a split among the courts of appeals, with
some courts holding that Chevron must either yield outright or be limited
by the rule of lenity, and other courts holding that the rule of lenity is
inapplicable in the Chevron context.217 Although this Note does not seek to
provide a resolution to this conflict, it is another factor that must be
considered in the calculus of whether § 1226(c) is ambiguous for purposes
of Chevron Step One, and whether the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is
permissible.
II. THE CASES AND POLICY ISSUES AT PLAY
Part II of this Note outlines in greater detail the various approaches the
BIA and federal courts have taken in determining whether § 1226(c)
imposes a timing requirement, and what consequences would ensue should
DHS fail to satisfy that requirement. The discussion begins with the BIA’s
construction of the TPCR and § 1226(c), and then proceeds to Hosh v.
209. Id. at 7–8.
210. Id. at 4.
211. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also David S. Rubenstein,
Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort After
Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 491–94 (2007).
212. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 239 (1993)).
213. See generally Greenfield, supra note 207.
214. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
215. Id. at 320–21 n.45 (“We only defer . . . to agency interpretations of statutes that,
applying the normal ‘tools of statutory construction,’ are ambiguous. Because a statute that
is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be
unambiguously prospective . . . there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute
for an agency to resolve.”).
216. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia has opined that because the DOJ
would be inclined to interpret a criminal statute broadly, granting Chevron deference “would
turn the normal construction of criminal statutes upside-down, replacing the doctrine of
lenity with a doctrine of severity.” Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 178 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Greenfield, supra note 207, at 41–47.
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Lucero,218 in which the Fourth Circuit deferred to the BIA’s construction of
§ 1226(c) under the Chevron framework. The next section details the
rationale of a number of federal district courts that have explicitly disagreed
with the BIA and Hosh, finding that § 1226(c) requires DHS to detain
qualifying noncitizens immediately after their release from criminal
custody.219 Finally, the last section considers an amendment proposed by
the House Judiciary Committee that would, among other things, modify
§ 1226(c) to permit DHS to detain qualifying noncitizen offenders at any
time, irrespective of whether such individuals were ever incarcerated.
A. The BIA’s Interpretation of “When Released”
The BIA has interpreted the “when released” language in two separate
decisions. In In re Garvin Noble,220 the BIA first interpreted the “when
released” language in the TPCR, holding that DHS was not required to take
a qualifying noncitizen immediately into custody.221 In In re Rojas,222 the
BIA adopted this same interpretation of § 1226(c), holding that DHS could
detain a qualifying noncitizen without bond at any time after his release
from criminal custody.223
1. Garvin-Noble & Pastor-Camarena
The BIA’s interpretation of the “when released” language was
controversial before § 1226(c) even took effect. In an early decision
construing a similar provision of the TPCR, the BIA held that the “when
released” language “does not define the category of criminal aliens
covered” by the mandatory detention provision.224 Rather, the majority
held that the “when released” language “modifies the command that the
‘Attorney General shall take into custody’ certain criminal aliens, by
specifying that it be done ‘when the alien is released’ from
incarceration.”225 Because the “when released” language does not modify
the class of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention, the majority
concluded that noncitizens with qualifying offenses are subject to
mandatory detention “regardless of the particular alien’s date of release
from criminal incarceration or whether the alien was ever subject to
criminal incarceration.”226
But the majority of district courts who had occasion to review GarvinNoble rejected it.227 For example, in Pastor-Camarena v. Smith,228 the
218. 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
219. Id. at 381.
220. 21 I. & N. Dec. 672 (B.I.A. 1997).
221. Id. at 682.
222. 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (B.I.A. 2001).
223. Id. at 127.
224. Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 680.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 682.
227. See Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 125–26 (noting that “[o]ur analysis has been rejected
by several district courts,” and citing eight different district court cases rejecting the
interpretation espoused in Garvin-Noble and two decisions following it).
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Western District of Washington, relying on the plain meaning of the statute,
held that the “when released” language applies only to noncitizens who are
detained immediately upon release from criminal custody and not to
noncitizens released many years earlier.229 Additionally, the court went on
to note that the BIA’s interpretation in Garvin-Noble was “arbitrary and
capricious.”230
2. In re Rojas
After the expiration of the TPCR, the BIA revisited its interpretation of
the “when released” language in Rojas.231 In Rojas, the BIA heard an
appeal from respondent Victor Leonard Rojas, an LPR from the Dominican
Republic, who was being detained under § 1226(c).232 Rojas had
previously been convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell in
1998.233 The AG brought removal proceedings against Rojas, and
immigration authorities took him into custody on July 26, 2000, two days
after he was released from criminal incarceration.234 The BIA, sitting en
banc, held in a thirteen-to-seven decision that a noncitizen criminal offender
who is released from criminal custody is subject to mandatory detention,
“even if the alien is not immediately taken into custody . . . when released
from incarceration.”235
Although the majority reached the same conclusion as it did in GarvinNoble, Rojas offered a more in-depth analysis. Authored by the same
member who wrote Garvin-Noble, the majority continued to employ the
categorical framework adopted in Garvin-Noble to demonstrate that the
timing of detention is irrelevant to the government’s authority to detain
individuals under § 1226(c). That is, the BIA understood the issue to be
whether the “when released” language “is a necessary part of the
description of the alien in paragraph (1).”236 If so, then noncitizens not
immediately detained would not be within the ambit of the statute.237
Conversely, if the “when released” language is not a part of the description
of a detainable noncitizen, then such a noncitizen would be within the scope
of the statute and the AG could seek detention without any temporal
limitation.238

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

977 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D. Wash. 1997).
Id. at 1417–18.
Id. at 1418.
See Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
See id.
See id.
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a. Rojas’s Structural Argument
In finding that the “when released” language is not a part of the
description of a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention, the majority
looked primarily to the structure of § 1226(c).239 The Board noted that
§ 1226(c) is divided into two paragraphs: paragraph (1) details the
categories of noncitizens that the AG must take into custody, and paragraph
(2) speaks to the conditions under which the AG may release “an alien
described in paragraph (1).”240 According to the majority, “The statutory
reference to ‘an alien described in paragraph (1)’ seems to us most
appropriately to be a reference to an alien described by one of four
subparagraphs, (A) through (D),” and does not include the remaining
portion of paragraph (1) where the “when released” language is found.241
None of the cases analyzed in this Note discuss whether the “when
released” language is a description of the noncitizen.
b. The Overall Statutory Context
Nevertheless, recognizing that the statute is “susceptible to different
readings,” the majority in Rojas also considered § 1226(c) alongside other
statutory provisions pertaining to removal.242 The majority found that there
is no connection in the INA between the timing of a noncitizen’s release
from criminal custody, the timing of detention, and the applicability of
“Furthermore,” the majority
criminal charges of removability.243
continued, “the [INA] does not tie an alien’s eligibility for any form of
relief from removal to the timing of the alien’s release from incarceration
and the assumption of custody by the [INS].”244 As a result, the majority
concluded, the “‘when released’ issue is irrelevant for all other immigration
purposes.”245
c. Legislative Purpose
The Rojas majority also discussed the legislative purpose and history of
§ 1226(c), stating that the statute was born out of Congress’s frustration
with the ability of criminal noncitizens to avoid removal if they were not
actually in custody, and noting that “some criminal aliens abscond after
being issued a final order of deportation.”246 From this the majority
concluded, “Congress was not simply concerned with detaining and
239. Id. at 121.
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).
241. Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 121. It is noteworthy, however, that the “statutory
reference” cited by the majority appears in paragraph (2) of § 1226 and only governs the
AG’s power to release aliens already lawfully held pursuant to the statute. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c).
242. Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 120.
243. Id. at 122.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 23 (1995)).
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removing aliens coming directly out of criminal custody; it was concerned
with detaining and removing all criminal aliens.”247
d. Predecessor Provisions
The majority in Rojas also grounded its analysis in the history of
mandatory detention statutes, the first of which was the Anti–Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 (ADAA). The ADAA provided: “The Attorney General shall
take into custody any alien convicted of an aggravated felony upon
completion of the alien’s sentence for such conviction.”248 The provision
was amended in 1990 to read, “The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien convicted of an aggravated felony upon release of the
alien.”249 Like § 1226(c), the 1990 amendment had a second paragraph that
provided, “The Attorney General may not release from custody any
lawfully admitted alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony.”250 The majority reasoned that paragraph one commanded the AG
to take all criminal noncitizens subject to mandatory detention into custody,
and that the AG could not release such individuals unless certain conditions
were met.251 Taken together, the BIA found that the two provisions are
“strong evidence that Congress was not attempting to restrict mandatory
detention to criminal aliens taken immediately into [ICE] custody at the
time of their release from a state or federal correctional institution.”252
e. The Dissenting Opinion in Rojas
The dissent took issue with the majority opinion in a number of ways.
First, the dissenters argued that the “when released” language is “part of the
statutory description identifying the aliens whom the Attorney General
must take into custody and may not release.”253 Next, the dissenters turned
to the plain meaning of the “when released” language, noting that “when”
means “just after the moment that.”254 From this the dissenters concluded
that the clear language of the statute required immigration authorities to
take noncitizen offenders into custody “‘at the time of release.’”255
The dissenters also argued that, because the majority of federal district
courts interpreted that a similar provision in the AEDPA only applied to
noncitizens who were taken into custody “within a reasonable time after
release from incarceration,”256 then Congress should be understood to have

247. Id.
248. Id. at 123 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2006)).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 123–24.
252. Id. at 124.
253. Id. at 130 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 132 (quoting Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2602 (3d ed. 1976))).
255. Id. (quoting Alikhani, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1130).
256. Id. at 135 (citing DeMelo v. Cobb, 936 F. Supp. 30, 36 (D. Mass. 1996)).
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acquiesced to that interpretation.257 Finally, the dissent noted that in light
of the serious liberty interests that mandatory detention entails, the statute
should be given a narrow construction.258
B. Courts Agreeing with the BIA
Several courts have followed the BIA’s determination in Rojas. Most
notably, in Hosh v. Lucero,259 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit
court to directly address the timing issue presented by § 1226(c).260 Hosh
Mohamed Hosh, a citizen of Somalia, arrived in the United States as a
derivative asylee in 1999.261 He was granted LPR status in 2007.262 The
following year, he was convicted of “unlawful wounding” and grand
larceny in the state of Virginia, and was released on supervised probation
for a period of two years.263 On March 21, 2011, ICE officials arrested him
and detained him under § 1226(c).264
Hosh did not contest that he was removable, but questioned the
government’s authority to detain him without bond because ICE failed to
take him into custody upon his release from criminal custody.265 The
district court, relying on prior decisions from the Eastern District of
Virginia, granted Hosh’s habeas petition, holding that § 1226(c) only
applies when the AG has acted in full compliance with the statute.266 In
other words, the district court found that the government must detain the
noncitizen immediately upon release from criminal custody.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that § 1226(c) is ambiguous, and
that the BIA’s construction expressed in Rojas was a permissible one.267 In
determining that § 1226(c) is ambiguous, the court noted that “when” can
be given the meaning “action or activity occurring ‘at the time that’ or ‘as
soon as’ other action has ceased or begun.”268 But the court noted that
“‘when’ can also be read to mean the temporally broader ‘at or during the
time that,’ ‘while,’ or ‘at any or every time that.’”269 As a result, the court
found that § 1226(c) is ambiguous.270
257. Id. at 136.
258. Id. at 138 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
259. 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
260. For a discussion of the related First Circuit decision in Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7
(1st Cir. 2009), see infra Part II.D.
261. Hosh, 680 F.3d at 377.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 377–78.
265. Id. at 378.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 384.
268. Id. at 379 (quoting Waffi v. Loiselle, 527 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (E.D. Va. 2007)).
269. Id. at 380 (quoting When, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/when (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)).
270. The court also referred to the concurring opinion in Rojas, which noted, “It is
difficult to conclude that Congress meant to premise the success of its mandatory detention
scheme on the capacity of [ICE] to appear at the jailhouse door to take custody of an alien at
the precise moment of release.” Id. (quoting In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 128 (B.I.A.
2001) (Moscato, J., concurring)).
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The court next held that the BIA’s construction of the statute is a
permissible one.271 The court grounded its analysis of the reasonableness
of Rojas in the justifications for the mandatory detention scheme as
expressed in the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore.272 The court
concluded,
[W]e agree that Congress’s command to the Attorney General . . .
connotes some degree of immediacy, [but] we cannot conclude that
Congress clearly intended to exempt a criminal alien from mandatory
detention and make him eligible for release on bond if the alien is not
immediately taken into federal custody.273

The court took its analysis one step further by holding that even if the
statute required the government to immediately detain a criminal noncitizen
upon release from criminal custody, the court would still conclude that a
noncitizen detained after release would not be able to escape mandatory
detention.274 The court looked to United States v. Montalvo-Murillo,275 a
decision in which the Supreme Court held that the government was not
required to release a suspect simply because it failed to provide a bail
hearing “immediately upon the [suspect’s] first appearance before the
judicial officer.”276 The Supreme Court reasoned, “Although the duty is
mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later powers to act.”277
The Fourth Circuit stressed the same rationale expressed by the Supreme
Court in Montalvo-Murillo: the negligence and human error of officers or
other administrators cannot be allowed to undermine public safety and
thwart congressional intent.278
Finally, the court declined to apply the rule of lenity. The court
acknowledged, “In immigration cases, the rule of lenity stands for the
proposition that ambiguities in deportation statutes should be construed in
favor of the noncitizen.”279 Recognizing that there is some tension between
the rule of lenity and Chevron deference, the court found that the rule of
lenity did not apply in this case because the rule operates only as “a last
resort, not a primary tool of construction.”280 Although the court conceded
that § 1226(c) was ambiguous, the ambiguity was not “grievous” such that

271. Id. at 380.
272. Id. at 380–81.
273. Id. at 381.
274. Id.
275. 495 U.S. 711 (1990) (holding that the Government’s failure to comply with the Bail
Reform Act’s prompt hearing provision did not require release of an arrestee). It should be
noted here that the precise issue presented by the timing question of § 1226(c) is not whether
noncitizen offenders must be released if they are not immediately detained, but whether they
are entitled to a bond hearing. See, e.g., Castillo v. ICE Field Office Dir., 907 F. Supp. 2d
1235, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
276. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 714.
277. Id. at 718.
278. Hosh, 680 F.3d at 382–83.
279. Id. at 383 (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9–10 (1948)).
280. Id. (quoting United States v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 858 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

316

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

application of the rule was required.281 The court also expressed its doubts
that the justifications for the rule of lenity, which it described as relief from
the drastic measure of deportation, were present here.282 “After all,” the
court concluded, “a criminal alien in Hosh’s position would be subject to
deportation proceedings whether or not § 1226(c) existed; the provision
merely withdraws the Attorney General’s discretion to release such an alien
on bond pending those proceedings.”283
In Sylvain v. Attorney General of the United States284 the Third Circuit
recently joined the Fourth Circuit in determining that the failure to detain
noncitizen offenders immediately after release from incarceration does not
alter the government’s ability to detain such individuals for the duration of
their removal proceedings without bond.285 Interestingly, the court found
that it was unnecessary to conduct a Chevron inquiry.286 Rather, relying on
the Montalvo-Murillo line of cases discussed above, the court held that,
irrespective of whether the statute imposes a timing requirement, failure to
comply would not deprive DHS of the authority to detain noncitizen
offenders without a bond hearing.287
The Third Circuit recognized that Montalvo-Murillo was distinguishable:
in Montalvo-Murillo the government would have been deprived of the
ability to detain dangerous criminals altogether, while here, the government
would merely be required to conduct a bond hearing.288 Nevertheless, the
court held that “in the ways that matter, the cases are alike.”289 The statute,
the court concluded, was intended to protect the public, and mandated
detention, “no matter the perceived flight risk or danger.”290
Several district courts have found the Third Circuit’s reasoning
unpersuasive.291 These courts agree that the Third Circuit’s reliance on the
Montalvo-Murillo line of cases was misguided because requiring the
government to provide a bond hearing when it fails to immediately detain
noncitizen offenders does not deprive the government of the power to

281. Id. at 383 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)).
282. Id. at 384.
283. Id.
284. 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013).
285. Id. at 161. Prior to the Sylvain decision, the overwhelming majority of district courts
in the Third Circuit concluded that failure to effect immediate detention required the
government to provide noncitizen offenders with a bond hearing. See, e.g., Christie v.
Elwood, No. 11-7070, 2012 WL 266454, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2012); Parfait v. Holder, No.
11-4877, 2011 WL 4829391, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2011); Beckford v. Aviles, No. 10-2035,
2011 WL 3515933, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2011); Sylvain v. Holder, No. 11-3006, 2011 WL
2580506, at *1 (D.N.J. June 28, 2011), rev’d, 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013).
286. Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 157.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 160.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 159.
291. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Souza, No. CIV.A. 13-10874-WGY, 2013 WL 3353747, at
*1 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013); Baquera v. Longshore, No. 13-CV-00543-RM-MEH, 2013 WL
2423178, at *1 (D. Colo. June 4, 2013); Deluis-Morelos v. ICE Field Office Dir., No. 12CV1905JLR, 2013 WL 1914390, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2013).
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detain the noncitizen offender.292 Rather, the government may still detain
the noncitizen offender upon a finding that he is dangerous to the public or
a flight risk.293
C. Courts Disagreeing with the BIA
Not all courts have agreed with Rojas. Working within the Chevron
framework, the majority of federal courts have found that the statute is
unambiguous and that DHS is not permitted to detain individuals long after
those individuals are released from criminal custody. Other courts have
also held that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.
Finally, a few courts have found that Rojas is factually or legally
distinguishable.
1. Section 1226(c) Is Unambiguous
Numerous district courts have held that § 1226(c) is unambiguous, and
that the statute only authorizes the detention of individuals immediately
upon their release from criminal custody. In Louisaire v. Muller,294 for
example, the Southern District of New York heard a habeas petition filed by
Jean Louisaire, a citizen of Haiti and an LPR. In October 2010, ICE
detained Louisaire pursuant to § 1226(c) claiming that he had committed an
aggravated felony.295 Louisaire argued that the predicate offense that
formed the basis for his detention, a seventh degree misdemeanor drug
conviction, happened several years prior to his detention.296 He argued
that, as a result, ICE could not detain him under § 1226(c).
Citing to Rojas, the government took the position that the delay was
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether an individual is detainable
under § 1226(c).297 The court vehemently disagreed with the government’s
position, finding Rojas “wrong as a matter of law and contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute.”298 The court held that the statute clearly expressed
the intent to create “‘a nexus between the date of release and the removable
offense.’”299 Therefore, the court concluded that DHS must take a
noncitizen into custody immediately after he is released from criminal
custody.
As noted, many district courts have reached similar conclusions in
finding that the plain meaning of § 1226(c) requires immediate detention.300
292. See, e.g., Castaneda, 2013 WL 3353747, at *11 (“Because no power or authority is
lost when the Attorney General fails to detain an alien immediately upon release, this Court
must reject the analysis that concludes that such a failure does not affect whether the alien is
subject to mandatory detention.”).
293. See id.
294. 758 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
295. Id. at 231–33.
296. Id. at 233.
297. Id. at 236.
298. Id.
299. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Shanahan, 615 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
300. At least one district court has also found that the broad reading of § 1226(c)
endorsed by the BIA would render the “when released” language unnecessary, and hence
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In Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge,301 the Western District of Washington held that
“‘the clear language of the statute indicates that the mandatory detention of
aliens ‘when’ they are released requires that they be detained at the time of
release.’”302 In Khodr v. Adduci, the Eastern District of Michigan noted, “If
Congress wished to permit the Attorney General to take custody of criminal
aliens at any time after being released from criminal confinement, it could
have done so using the phrase ‘at any time after the alien is released.’”303
Interestingly, the court in Khodr also acknowledged that a “literal
immediacy” requirement would pose difficulties for immigration
authorities, and held that “immediacy contemplates that the Attorney
General has a reasonable period of time after release in which to take the
suspect alien into custody.”304
2. The Reasonableness of the BIA’s Interpretation
The courts that reject Rojas have unanimously found that § 1226(c)
unambiguously requires the immediate detention of noncitizen offenders
when those individuals are released from criminal custody. Therefore, very
few district court cases have reached the reasonableness of the BIA
interpretation under Chevron Step Two. However, several courts seem to
incorporate reasonableness concerns into their analysis of the meaning of
§ 1226(c).305 In Quezada-Bucio,306 for example, the court noted that the
petitioner had lived in the community for years after being released from
criminal custody without committing additional crimes and without
attempting to elude immigration authorities.307 The court suggested that

surplusage, an occurrence courts should seek to avoid. Valdez v. Terry, 874 F. Supp. 2d
1262, 1267–68 (D.N.M. 2012).
301. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
302. Id. at 1230 (quoting Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (S.D. Cal.
1999)); see also Kporlor v. Hendricks, No. CIV.A. 12-2755 DMC, 2012 WL 4900918, at *6
(D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2012) (“Rather than taking the plain meaning of the statute, the government
has re-written the statute.”).
303. Khodr v. Adduci, 697 F. Supp. 2d 774, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
304. Id. at 780; see also Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-03335 WHA, 2005 WL 3157377, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (holding that DHS need not act immediately, but must act
within a reasonable time).
305. See Louisaire v. Muller, 758 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Even if it were
ambiguous, the BIA’s interpretation of the statute in Matter of Rojas is unreasonable.
Reading § 1226(c)(1) as authorizing mandatory detention upon any release from criminal
custody, regardless of that release’s connection to the enumerated offenses, would produce
absurd results.” (citations omitted)); Ortiz v. Holder, No. 2:11CV1146 DAK, 2012 WL
893154, at *3 (D. Utah Mar. 14, 2012) (“Moreover, even if Congress’s intent were
ambiguous, the Board’s interpretation of the statute is not reasonable because it leads to
arbitrary and manifestly unjust results.”); see also Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“By any logic, it stands to reason that the more remote in time a conviction
becomes and the more time after a conviction an individual spends in a community, the
lower his bail risk is likely to be.”).
306. Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
307. Id. at 1231.
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mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing in such
circumstances would be unreasonable.308
3. Rojas Distinguished
Courts have also distinguished Rojas on factual and legal grounds. In
Zabadi v. Chertoff, for example, the Northern District of California held
that, even if the court found § 1226(c) to be ambiguous, Rojas would not be
entitled to deference because immigration authorities detained the petitioner
in Rojas a mere two days after his release from criminal custody.309 In the
instant case, DHS detained the petitioner two years after he was released
from criminal custody.310 Thus, the court concluded, “Rojas did not even
consider and address the point of statutory interpretation controlling in this
order.”311
At least one other court has determined that Rojas did not actually
construe the “when released” language of § 1226(c), and hence the BIA did
not determine the legal issue in such a way that it would be entitled to
deference by a reviewing court. In Guillaume v. Muller,312 the Southern
District of New York found that in construing § 1226(c), the BIA
improperly severed the “when released” language from the rest of the
statute.313 Therefore, the court found that the BIA had failed to meet the
precise statutory issue before the court, and as a result, Rojas was not
entitled to deference.314 Interestingly, the court ultimately reached the same
conclusion as the BIA,315 becoming the only federal court to do so outside
of the Chevron context.
4. Saysana: A Narrow Exception or a Binding Decision?
Although the First Circuit has not directly weighed in on the “when
released” issue, its decision in Saysana v. Gillen316 is relevant to the
discussion. Houng Saysana, a citizen of Laos, entered the United States in
1980 as a refugee, and was convicted in 1990 of indecent assault and
battery.317 He served three months of a five-year sentence before being
released.318 Saysana was again arrested in 2005, this time for failing to
register as a sex offender.319 The charge was dismissed, and he was

308. Id. at 1230–31 (“The Court is not persuaded that the legislature was seeking to
justify mandatory immigration custody many months or even years after an alien had been
released from state custody.”).
309. Zabadi, 2005 WL 3157377, at *4.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. No. 11 CIV. 8819 TPG, 2012 WL 383939, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012).
313. Id. at *4.
314. Id.
315. Id. at *6.
316. 590 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2009).
317. Id. at 9.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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released from custody.320 Two years later, ICE officers detained him
pursuant to § 1226(c), maintaining that his 1990 conviction was an
aggravated felony within the meaning of the statute.321
In In re Saysana,322 the BIA concluded that § 1226(c) applies to any
noncitizen with a qualifying conviction who has been released from any
criminal custody after the effective date of the IIRIRA.323 Recognizing that
§ 1226(c) does not have retroactive effect,324 the First Circuit disagreed
because Saysana’s qualifying offense occurred prior to the enactment of the
IIRIRA.325 The court found that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute
would create an arbitrary distinction between individuals who had
committed qualifying offenses prior to the enactment of the statute and
those individuals who had committed qualifying offenses prior to the
enactment of the statute and who were released from criminal custody for
an unrelated charge postenactment.326
Significantly, the court discussed the reasonableness of enforcing a
mandatory detention scheme against individuals who were released from
criminal custody years prior to being detained. The court noted that the
government’s interests—preserving the public safety and deterring flight—
become attenuated “the more remote in time a conviction becomes and the
more time after a conviction an individual spends in a community.”327
The court did not directly decide whether a noncitizen convicted of a
qualifying offense postenactment of the IIRIRA could escape mandatory
detention if ICE failed to detain him immediately upon release from
custody for the qualifying offense.328 Even so, the court’s language
suggests that the “when released” language is subject to some limitation:
“‘The Court is not persuaded that the legislature was seeking to justify
mandatory immigration custody many months or even years after an alien

320. Id.
321. Id. at 9–10.
322. 24 I. & N. Dec. 602 (B.I.A. 2008). In light of the near uniform rejection of the
BIA’s interpretation, the BIA later reversed its position consistent with the First Circuit’s
interpretation. In re Garcia Arreola, 25 I. & N. Dec. 267, 269 (B.I.A. 2010) (“[W]e now
withdraw from Matter of Saysana.”).
323. Saysana, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 607–08.
324. See Saysana, 590 F.3d at 10 (granting habeas relief).
325. Id. at 17.
326. Id. at 18.
327. Id. at 17–18.
328. Nevertheless, at least one district court has seized on the First Circuit’s construction
of § 1226(c), arguing that the court held that the statute unambiguously requires immediate
detention. See, e.g., Nimako v. Shanahan, No. CIV. 12-4909 FLW, 2012 WL 4121102, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2012). However, this reliance on Saysana’s interpretation of the
unambiguousness of § 1226(c) may be misguided. The Saysana court focused primarily on
the arbitrarily different treatment of similarly situated aliens (i.e., those who would not
otherwise be within the purview of the statute because the qualifying offense occurred prior
to the enactment of the IIRIRA), and not whether ICE is required to immediately detain
criminal aliens when released from custody. See Valdez v. Terry, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1262,
1274 (D.N.M. 2012) (limiting Saysana and stating that any discussion of the timing of the
“when released” clause is dictum).
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had been released from state custody.’”329 However, it remains to be seen
whether, and how, the First Circuit would define such limitations.
5. The Keep Our Communities Safe Act
On May 22, 2011, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith
introduced H.R. 1932, the Keep Our Communities Safe Act (KOCSA).330
Section 2(b)(5) of KOCSA proposes that criminal noncitizens are subject to
mandatory detention “any time after the alien is released, without regard to
whether an alien is released related to any activity, offense, or conviction
described in this paragraph.”331
KOCSA was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on October
18, 2011.332 The Committee explicitly rejected the approach taken by those
courts finding that § 1226(c) requires DHS to detain noncitizens
immediately upon release from criminal custody.333 The Committee Report
states, “Putting aside the proper reading of [§ 1226], these decisions make
little policy sense.”334 The Report notes that the justifications for
mandatory detention—“to protect the American public and to ensure that
removal orders can be effectuated”—are served equally whether or not
noncitizens are placed into detention immediately after incarceration.335
The section concludes that “in fact, it makes no difference if they were ever
incarcerated.”336
The “Dissenting Views” section of the report explains that “section
(2)(b)(5) expands the mandatory detention of persons, without the
possibility of release on bond and without consideration of whether
detention is necessary.”337 The expansion, the dissenters note, “is unwise,
During
inefficient, and raises serious constitutional concerns.”338
Committee voting, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee introduced an
amendment that would have stricken section 2(b)(5), the provision dealing
with the “when released” language, altogether.339 Representative Jackson
Lee’s amendment failed by one vote, and section 2(b)(5) was reported out
with the rest of the KOCSA.340 Congress did not enact the bill, however,
and Chairman Smith reintroduced it as H.R. 1901 in May 2013.341
329. Saysana, 590 F.3d at 16 (quoting Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221,
1230 (W.D. Wash. 2004)).
330. H.R. 132 (112th): Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1932# (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
331. H.R. REP. NO. 112-255, at 5 (2011).
332. Id. at 1.
333. Id. at 19. The Report specifically mentions the decision in Saysana, and rejects the
premise that an alien may only be detained following incarceration for a detainable offense.
Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 52.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 23.
340. Id.
341. H.R. 132 (112th): Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011, supra note 330.
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III. WHEN MEANS WHEN: IMMEDIATE DETENTION
AND REASONABLENESS
Consistent with the majority of federal courts that have heard the
question, courts should find that § 1226(c) requires the immediate detention
of noncitizen offenders when they are released from criminal custody.
However, because a literal immediacy requirement would be impracticable
and may inadvertently subvert the purpose of the statute, courts should
permit DHS a reasonable time in which to effect custody. Therefore, this
Note disagrees with the BIA’s approach, and agrees in part with those
decisions, such as Louisaire and Quezada-Bucio, that find § 1226(c)
requires immediate detention. This view is also in accord with the district
court’s decision in Khodr recognizing the impracticability of immediate
detention.
A. Rojas Is Not Entitled to Deference
Courts should not defer to the BIA’s determination in Rojas because, at
the outset, it is unclear whether Congress intended to delegate the authority
to interpret § 1226(c) to the AG. Additionally, the text of the statute, as
well as its structure and overarching purpose, all appear to require DHS to
detain qualifying noncitizen offenders immediately upon their release from
criminal custody. There is nothing in the legislative history or in the
changes from preceding detention provisions that would suggest Congress
intended to permit DHS to detain individuals without bond at any time after
their release from criminal custody. Finally, even if there were ambiguity
in § 1226(c) that was incapable of judicial resolution, the rule of lenity
would militate against the broad reading of the statute adopted by the BIA.
1. Step Zero Inquiry
As an initial matter, the Step Zero inquiry requires courts to determine
whether the Chevron framework even applies. Chevron deference applies
only when Congress has delegated the authority to issue a rule with the
force of law and the agency interpretation was issued pursuant to that
authority.342 Ambiguity itself is an insufficient indicator of Congress’s
intent.343 Rather, the “linchpin for deference” is a formal exercise of an
agency’s authority to act with the force of law.344 Here, because Congress
clearly intended to eliminate the AG’s discretion, it is unlikely that
Congress intended to delegate power to the AG to act with the force of law
with respect to this issue.
Although several courts have noted that the BIA is generally entitled to
Chevron deference, none of the decisions have considered whether
Congress intended to delegate the authority to interpret § 1226(c) to the
BIA. Even a cursory glance at § 1226(c) suggests that it is highly unlikely
342. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.

2013]

THE REQUIREMENTS OF MANDATORY DETENTION

323

that Congress intended for the BIA to be able to determine when the agency
is permitted to detain individuals under the statute. The entire function of
§ 1226(c) is to remove the discretion exercised by the AG with respect to
qualifying criminal offenders, except in certain limited circumstances where
the AG deems it necessary to protect witnesses.345 As the Court noted in
Demore, § 1226(c) was born out of Congress’s frustration with the
immigration authorities’ “near-total inability to remove deportable criminal
aliens.”346 Indeed, it would be strange if, after commanding the AG to
detain all individuals who have committed qualifying offenses without the
possibility of bond, Congress then intended to allow the AG to permit that
same class of removable criminal noncitizens to return to their communities
for years while waiting for the AG to comply with Congress’s mandate.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to defer to
agency interpretations affecting large issues, or those with significant
consequences.347 Here, the detention of an individual without the
possibility of parole for months, or potentially years, can hardly be
considered a minor, or interstitial question. Additionally, given the
significant liberty interests involved, the question seems ill-suited to the
executive branch, and the AG’s expertise in immigration matters are of little
assistance. Indeed, although it appears that no petitioners have raised a
substantive due process challenge to the BIA’s broad interpretation of the
class of individuals subject to mandatory detention, to the extent that the
BIA’s interpretation raises constitutional concerns, the BIA lacks
jurisdiction to decide it.348 As a result, courts should find that the BIA’s
interpretation of the “when released” language is not entitled to Chevron
deference. Courts should move on an expedited basis, as DHS may readily
destroy a petitioner’s standing, evading proper review of the BIA’s
interpretation of § 1226(c).349
2. Section 1226(c) Requires Immediate Detention
This Note joins the majority of federal courts in finding that § 1226(c)
unambiguously requires immediate detention. This conclusion is supported
by the text, as well as the purpose of § 1226(c). There is nothing in the
legislative history, or in the predecessor provision to suggest otherwise.
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Hosh, interpreting § 1226(c)
to impose a timing requirement on DHS does not result in a windfall to
certain noncitizen offenders. Finally, even if § 1226(c) is found to be

345. See supra Part I.A.4.a.
346. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
347. See supra notes 200–05 and accompanying text; see also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (“[W]e are confident that Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to
an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”).
348. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the government’s
ability to alter its authority for detention, thereby destroying standing).
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ambiguous, the rule of lenity militates against the broad reading endorsed
by the BIA.
a. The Text of the Statute Requires
Immediate Detention
As the majority of district courts have held, the plain meaning of the text
of § 1226(c) requires DHS to detain noncitizen offenders at the time the
noncitizen is released from criminal custody.350 These courts correctly note
that, unless reading a technical or legal term of art, courts must give words
and phrases their ordinary meaning when construing a statute.351
According to The Oxford Dictionary of Current English, the primary
definition of the word “when” is “as soon as” or “at the time that.”352
Therefore, § 1226(c) should be interpreted to mean that the AG must detain
a criminal noncitizen who has committed a qualifying offense as soon as, or
at the time that, the noncitizen is released from criminal custody.
Nevertheless, the BIA, and those courts following its decision in Rojas
struggle with, or simply ignore, the ordinary meaning of the word
“when.”353 In its analysis of the “ordinary meaning” of § 1226(c), the
majority in Rojas does not even discuss the meaning of the word “when.”
Rather, after conceding that the word “when” fixes the time at which the
AG’s duty to detain criminal noncitizens arises, the BIA turned instead to a
determination of whether the “when released” language can properly be
understood as a description of “an alien described in paragraph (1).”354
Thus, as at least one court noted, it is not even clear that the BIA addressed
the precise question at issue: what happens when the AG fails to detain a
noncitizen offender at the moment when the noncitizen is released from
criminal custody?355
None of the cases discussed followed the BIA’s “description of the alien”
analysis. Instead, they found ambiguity in the text of the statute by looking
to secondary definitions of the word “when.” In Hosh, for example, the
Fourth Circuit noted that “when” can also mean “‘at or during the time
that,’ ‘while,’ or ‘at any or every time that.’”356 However, the reading of
§ 1226(c) advocated by Hosh and Rojas would require the court to find that
“when” means “at any time after,” and it is not immediately apparent that
any of the alternative definitions cited in Hosh actually support this broad
interpretation. Moreover, the approach taken in Hosh conflicts with the
ordinary meaning standard typically employed by courts to construe

350.
351.
352.
1993).
353.
354.
355.
356.

See supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Louisaire v. Muller, 758 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1046 (Della Thompson ed., 2d ed.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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statutory text.357 Because the ordinary meaning of the text clearly requires
immediate detention, Rojas should not be accorded Chevron deference.
b. The BIA’s Interpretation Is Unreasonable and Is Not
Supported by the Purposes of § 1226(c)
As the Supreme Court held in Demore, the congressional mandate to
detain noncitizen offenders without bail serves two interrelated purposes:
(1) mandatory detention helps to protect public safety by ensuring that
dangerous criminal offenders remain in custody pending their removal
proceedings; and (2) mandatory detention ensures that removable criminal
noncitizens appear for their removal proceedings.358 There is nothing to
suggest that the mandatory detention of individuals who have been returned
to the community serves either of these purposes.
As the First Circuit opined in Saysana, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the justifications for mandatory detention seem attenuated
when DHS permits an individual to return to the community after his
release from criminal custody.359 Absent further criminal conduct, these
twin justifications begin to appear increasingly strained with the passage of
time, and mandatory detention seems not only unnecessary, but arbitrary,
unfair, and even punitive. Moreover, the determination of whether a
noncitizen has committed an aggravated felony or two or more CIMT is a
highly complex legal inquiry, and because the determination to detain is
frequently made by an agent with little or no legal training, there is a high
risk of erroneous detention.360 Therefore, interpreting § 1226(c) to allow
DHS to detain noncitizen offenders without bond at any time after release
from criminal custody is not supported by the purpose of the statute.
c. Legislative History and Predecessor Provisions
Nothing in the legislative history suggests Congress contemplated
whether individuals who were not immediately brought into immigration
custody should be subject to mandatory detention.361 Moreover, the
changes Congress made over previous mandatory detention provisions
suggest that Congress either acquiesced in the interpretation provided by a
majority of federal district courts, or, more likely, that Congress never
considered the timing question.
In Hosh, the Fourth Circuit seized on the purposes for mandatory
detention articulated in the legislative history and in Demore to conclude
that Congress intended mandatory detention for all noncitizens with
qualifying convictions.362 However, as noted above, this position is not
357. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not
defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).
358. See supra Part I.A.4.b.iii.
359. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
360. See supra Part I.A.3.a–b; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part I.A.4.b.ii.
362. See supra Part II.B.
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supported by the purpose of the statute, and nothing in the legislative
history indicates Congress ever even considered the question.
In Rojas, the BIA also looked, unavailingly, to predecessor provisions in
support of its conclusion that DHS may assert mandatory detention at any
time after a noncitizen with a qualifying conviction is released from
criminal custody.363 In particular, the BIA, referring to a 1990 amendment
to the INA forbidding the AG from releasing “any lawfully admitted alien
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony,” concluded that this
provision applies to “all aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, regardless
of whether the aliens actually came into Service custody ‘upon release’
from criminal incarceration.”364
As the dissenters in Rojas noted, the BIA’s reliance on this language,
however, is misguided in several respects.365 First, the command to the AG
would only apply to individuals properly detained under the statute, and
hence, it does not answer whether DHS may detain an individual without
bond who was not detained “upon release” from criminal custody.366
Second, the majority of federal courts had interpreted this statute to require
immediate detention, and Congress must be understood to have acquiesced
to this interpretation.367
d. Congress’s Failure To Specify a Consequence Does Not
Support the BIA’s Interpretation of § 1226(c)
Nearly every court to consider the question has found that the text of the
statute creates a command directed at the AG to detain noncitizen offenders
with qualifying convictions “when the alien is released” from criminal
custody.368 In Sylvain and Hosh, however, the Third and Fourth Circuits
held that, because the statute does not provide a consequence for the failure
to immediately detain a noncitizen offender, Congress must have intended
to treat individuals detained long after their release from criminal custody
no differently from those detained immediately upon release from criminal
custody.369
However, Congress’s failure to specify a consequence cannot be
understood as a clear indication that Congress intended to ignore the
differences between individuals who had been released from custody and
were returned to the community, and those who were detained immediately.
Neither the statute, nor anything in the legislative history, contemplates

363. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
364. In re Rojas, 23 I & N. Dec. 117, 124 (B.I.A. 2001).
365. See supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
368. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006); see also Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir.
2012) (“[W]e agree that Congress’s command to the Attorney General to detain criminal
aliens ‘when . . . released from other custody connotes some degree of immediacy . . . .”).
369. Hosh, 680 F.3d at 382; see also supra notes 274–78 and accompanying text.
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anything other than immediate detention.370 Congress’s silence is therefore
more likely an indication that Congress did not consider the issue.
Absent additional statutory language, or legislative history to guide the
analysis, it would be pure conjecture to speculate how Congress would have
addressed the question. In such circumstances, a court is on surer ground
when cleaving to the text of the statute itself rather than extrapolating from
Congress’s silence a rule that would subject noncitizens to detention
without the possibility of parole. As Khodr371 makes clear, “[i]f Congress
wished to permit the Attorney General to take custody of criminal aliens at
any time after being released from criminal confinement, it could have done
so using the phrase ‘at any time after the alien is released.’”372
Moreover, Hosh and Sylvain mistakenly rely on Montalvo-Murillo in
holding that, even if § 1226(c) requires immediate detention, petitioners
may not rely on it because it would deprive the government of its ability to
act under the statute.373 Hosh was the first court to adopt this line of
reasoning, and subsequent courts have noted the court’s error: requiring the
AG to immediately detain criminal offenders does not deprive the AG of
the ability to act because the AG may still detain criminal offenders under
§ 1226(a) so long as the AG provides them with a bond hearing. Thus, the
absence of an express remedy cannot be understood as a clear congressional
signal to permit the AG to detain without bond noncitizen offenders
irrespective of how long they have been out of criminal custody.
Finally, in relying on Montalvo-Murillo, the Third and Fourth Circuits
stress that public safety should not be prejudiced by the government’s
failure to immediately detain noncitizen offenders.374 Although this point
has a certain appeal, under the current system many noncitizen offenders
have been held for nonviolent crimes.375 The public safety argument is
further undermined by the fact that, in any given case, the government has
permitted a particular noncitizen offender to return to the community for
months, or even years, without the noncitizen committing additional
criminal acts. Contrary to the Third and Fourth Circuits’ reasoning, the
public interest is served best by detaining dangerous noncitizen offenders
without bond immediately upon release from criminal custody and by
providing individualized bond hearings to assess the dangerousness and
flight risk of noncitizen offenders who have been released to the community
prior to their detention.

370. See supra Part I.A.4.b.i–ii.
371. Khodr v. Adduci, 697 F. Supp. 2d 774 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
372. Id. at 778.
373. See supra Part II.B.
374. See supra Part II.B; see also Sylvain v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 714 F.3d 150, 159 (3d
Cir. 2013).
375. For a discussion of the various kinds of crimes included under § 1226(c), including
CIMT, see supra Part I.A.3.
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e. Windfall to the Petitioner
In Hosh, the Fourth Circuit held that interpreting § 1226(c) to require
immediate detention would result in an unacceptable windfall to
individuals, and that the statute therefore permits DHS to detain noncitizen
offenders at any time after their release from criminal custody.376 But this
argument fails to take note of a key practical distinction: given an agency’s
finite resources, it is likely that DHS would seek to immediately detain
those individuals who have been convicted of the most dangerous
crimes.377 Thus, any windfall to noncitizen offenders not immediately
detained is more likely a result of the nature of the crimes committed, rather
than a chance mistake.
Furthermore, Hosh failed to acknowledge that all noncitizen offenders
remain subject to detention pending their removal proceedings. The
supposed windfall is merely a bond hearing to assess the dangerousness and
flight risk of the noncitizen offender. If an IJ determines that the petitioner
is in fact dangerous or a flight risk—the very justifications for mandatory
detention—then he will remain in DHS custody during the pendency of his
removal proceeding. Therefore, requiring immediate detention does not
result in a windfall to noncitizen offenders.
f. The Rule of Lenity
Finally, even if a reviewing court finds that § 1226(c) is irreducibly
ambiguous, the court should apply the rule of lenity rather than defer to the
BIA’s interpretation of the statute. As mentioned, although the rule of
lenity traditionally operates in the sphere of criminal law, the doctrine may
apply in immigration proceedings.378 Given the increasing similarity
between criminal law and immigration law, there is a growing need for the
application of the rule of lenity in the immigration context.
In Hosh, although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that there is
disagreement among the circuits regarding the correct application of the
rule of lenity in the Chevron context, the court failed to decide the issue.
Instead, the court held that, because the consequences of mandatory
detention are not “grievous,” the rule of lenity should not be applied.379
This approach fails to account for the significant amount of time an
individual may be held in immigration custody pending his removal
proceedings, the difficulty of the detained in seeking and retaining counsel,
and the hardship that mandatory detention poses with respect to the
376. Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2012).
377. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief
Counsel 1 (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/
detainer-policy.pdf (“These priorities ensure that ICE’s finite enforcement resources are
dedicated, to the greatest extent possible, to individuals whose removal promotes public
safety, national security, border security, and the integrity of the immigration system.”).
378. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 279–83 and accompanying text.
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separation of families.380 Therefore, the rule of lenity should be applied to
resolve the perceived ambiguity of the statute against the government.
B. Reasonableness Considerations
As a number of district courts have noted, it would be unreasonable for
courts to impose a literal immediacy requirement on the DHS.381
Therefore, courts should interpret the “when released” language to allow
DHS a reasonable amount of time to detain noncitizens who have been
convicted of qualifying offenses. This approach serves two additional
salutary purposes. First, it permits DHS to identify and allocate resources
to ensure that the agency detains the most dangerous criminal offenders.
Second, it provides DHS with a moment of circumspection to conduct the
difficult legal inquiry required to determine whether an individual has
committed an aggravated felony or two or more CIMT.
This
circumspection may help to limit the risk of erroneous detention.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether, and to what extent, § 1226(c) requires DHS to
immediately detain noncitizen offenders when they are released from
criminal custody exists in the intersection between criminal law and
immigration law, as well as the overlap between an executive agency’s
authority to interpret the statutes it administers and the judiciary’s
obligation to do so. Working within the Chevron framework, this Note
argues that § 1226(c) unambiguously requires immediate detention, and
further asserts that, as a practical matter, DHS may be afforded some
latitude in effecting detention. This approach balances the liberty interests
of detainees and the government’s interest in protecting the community
safety and ensuring removal by finding that, at a certain point, the
government’s interests are so attenuated that detainees should be provided
an individualized bond determination.
Congress, of course, is the branch best situated to determine whether
immediate detention is required, and should be encouraged to issue further
legislation to clarify its mandate. To avoid future challenges, Congress
should also conduct additional investigation to ascertain whether mandatory
detention is sufficiently related to its purposes when an individual has been
returned to his community and has been a productive member of that
community. However, absent further congressional action, the approach
this Note advocates represents the best solution to this perplexing problem.

380. See generally Heeren, supra note 15; Noferi, supra note 16.
381. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.

